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Consider two agents who learn the value of an unknown parameter by observing
a sequence of private signals. The signals are independent and identically dis-
tributed across time but not necessarily agents. Does it follow that the agents will
commonly learn its value, i.e., that the true value of the parameter will become
(approximate) common-knowledge? We show that the answer is afﬁrmative when
each agent’s signal space is ﬁnite and show by example that common learning can
fail when observations come from a countably inﬁnite signal space.
This is an important question for a number of reasons. Common learning is
precisely the condition that ensures efﬁcient outcomes in dynamic coordination
problems in which agents learn the appropriate course of action privately over
time. For example, suppose the two agents have the possibility of proﬁtably co-
ordinating on an action, but that the action depends on an unknown parameter. In
every period t = 0,1,..., each agent receives a signal. The agent can then choose
action A, action B, or to wait (W) until the next period. Simultaneous choices of A
when the parameter is θA or B when it is θB bring payoffs of 1 each. Lone choices
of A or B or joint choices that do not match the parameter bring a payoff of −c<0
and cause the investment opportunity to disappear. Waiting is costless. Figure 1
summarizes these payoffs.
Under what circumstances do there exist nontrivial equilibria of this invest-
ment game, i.e., equilibria in which the agents do not always wait? Choosing
action A is optimal for an agent in some period t only if the agent attaches proba-
bility at least c
c+1 ≡q to the joint event that the parameter is θA and the other agent
chooses A. Now consider the set of histories A at which both agents choose A. At
any such history, each agent ` must assign probability at least q to A , that is A
must be q-evident (Monderer and Samet, 1989). Furthermore, at any history in A ,
each agent ` must assign probability at least q to the parameter θA. But this pair
of conditions is equivalent to the statement that θA is common q-belief—the exis-
tence of histories at which there is common q-belief in θA is a necessary condition
for eventual coordination in this game. Conversely, the possibility of common
1A B W
A 1,1 −c,−c −c,0
B −c,−c −c,−c −c,0
W 0,−c 0,−c 0,0
Parameter θA
A B W
A −c,−c −c,−c −c,0
B −c,−c 1,1 −c,0
W 0,−c 0,−c 0,0
Parameter θB
Figure 1: Payoffs from a potential joint opportunity, with actions A, B, or wait
(W) available to each agent in each period.
q-belief is sufﬁcient for a nontrivial equilibrium, as it is an equilibrium for each
agent ` to choose A on the q-evident event on which θA is common q-belief.
Now suppose that various forms of this opportunity arise, characterized by
different values of the miscoordination penalty c. What does it take to ensure that
all of these opportunities can be exploited? It sufﬁces that the information process
be such that the parameter eventually becomes arbitrarily close to common 1-
belief.
Beyond coordination problems, common learning is a potentially important
tool in the analysis of dynamic games with incomplete information. In the equilib-
ria of these games, players typically learn over time about some unknown parame-
ter. Examples include reputation models such as Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson
(forthcoming), where one player learns the “type” of the other, and experimenta-
tion models such as Wiseman (2005), where players are learning about their joint
payoffs in an attempt to coordinate on some (enforceable) target outcome. Char-
acterizing equilibrium in these games requires analyzing not only each player’s
beliefs about payoffs, but also her beliefs about the beliefs of others and how these
higher-order beliefs evolve. Existing studies of these models have imposed strong
assumptions on the information structure in order to keep the analysis tractable.
We view our research as potentially leading to some general tools for studying
2common learning in dynamic games.
In general, the relationship between individual and common learning is subtle.
However, there are two special cases in which individual learning immediately
implies common learning. When the signals are public then beliefs are trivially
common-knowledge. At the opposite extreme, common learning occurs when the
agents’ signal processes are stochastically independent and so (conditional on the
parameter) each learns nothing about the other’s beliefs (Proposition 2).
Apart from these extreme cases, when the signals are private and not indepen-
dent, the following difﬁculty must be addressed. If the signals are correlated, and
if the realized signal frequencies for agent 1 (say) are sufﬁciently close to the pop-
ulation frequencies under the parameter θ, then 1 will be conﬁdent that θ is the
value of the parameter. Moreover, he will be reasonably conﬁdent that 2 will have
observed a frequency that leads to a similar degree of conﬁdence in θ. However,
if 1’s frequency is “just” close enough to lead to some ﬁxed degree of conﬁdence,
then 1 may not be conﬁdent that 2’s realized frequency leads to a similar degree
of conﬁdence: while 2’s frequency may be close to 1’s frequency, it may be on the
“wrong side” of the boundary for the required degree of conﬁdence.
If the set of signals is ﬁnite, the distribution of one agent’s signals, conditional
on the other agent’s signal, has a Markov chain interpretation. This allows us
to appeal to a contraction mapping principle in our proof of common learning,
ensuring that if agent 1’s signals are on the “right side” of a conﬁdence boundary
then so must be 1’s beliefs about 2’s signals. In contrast, with a countably inﬁnite
signal space, the corresponding Markov chain interpretation lacks the relevant
contraction mapping structure and common learning may fail.
While we have described the model as one in which the agents begin with
a common prior over the set of parameters, we explain in Remark 3 how our
analysis sheds light on agents who initially disagree but converge on a common
belief through a process of learning. Indeed, we can allow agents to begin the
process with arbitrary higher-order beliefs over the parameter space. As long
as each agent attaches some minimum probability to each parameter, and this is
3common knowledge, the agents will commonly learn the parameter and hence
approach a common posterior over the distribution of signals.
2 A Model of Multi-Agent Learning
2.1 Individual Learning
Time is discrete and periods are denoted by t = 0,1,2,.... Before period zero,
natureselectsaparameterθ fromtheﬁnitesetQaccordingtothepriordistribution
p.
For notational simplicity, we restrict attention to 2 agents, denoted ` = 1 (he)
and 2 (she). Our positive results (Propositions 2 and 3) hold for arbitrary ﬁnite
number of agents (see Remarks 2 and 4).
Conditional on θ, a stochastic process ζθ ≡{ζθ
t }¥
t=0 generates a signal proﬁle
zt ≡ (z1t,z2t) ∈ Z1 ×Z2 ≡ Z for each period t, where Z` is the set of possible
period-t signals for agent ` = 1,2. For each θ ∈ Q, the signal process {ζθ
t }¥
t=0
is independent and identically distributed across t. We let ζθ
` ≡ {ζ`t}¥
t=0 denote
the stochastic process generating agent `’s signals. When convenient, we let {θ}
denote the event {θ}×Z¥ that the parameter value is θ, and we often write θ
rather than {θ} when the latter appears as an argument of a function.
A state consists of a parameter and a sequence of signal proﬁles, with the set
of states given by W ≡ Q×Z¥. We use P to denote the measure on W induced by
the prior p and the signal processes (ζθ)θ∈Q, and use E[· ] to denote expectations
with respect to this measure. Let Pθ denote the measure conditional on a given
parameter and Eθ[· ] expectations with respect to this measure.
A period-t history for agent ` is denoted by h`t ≡ (z`0,z`1,...,z`t−1). We let
H`t ≡ (Z`)t denote the space of period-t histories for agent ` and let {H`t}¥
t=0
denote the ﬁltration induced on W by agent `’s histories. The random variables
{P(θ |H`t)}¥
t=0, giving agent `’s beliefs about the parameter θ at the start of each
period, are a bounded martingale with respect to the measure P, for each θ, and so
4the agents’ beliefs converge almost surely (Billingsley, 1979, Theorem 35.4). For
any state ω, h`t(ω) ∈ H`t is the agent ` period-t history induced by ω. As usual,
P(θ | H`t)(ω) is often written P(θ | h`t(ω)) or P(θ | h`t) when ω is understood.
For any event F ⊂ W, the H`t-measurable random variable E[1F | H`t] is the
probability agent ` attaches to F given her information at time t. We deﬁne
B
q
`t(F) ≡ {ω ∈ W : E[1F | H`t](ω) ≥ q}.
Thus, B
q
`t(F) is the set of states where at timet agent ` attaches at least probability
q to event F.
Deﬁnition 1 (Individual Learning) Agent ` learns parameter θ if conditional on
parameter θ, agent `’s posterior on θ converges in probability to 1, i.e., if for each
q ∈ (0,1) there is T such that for all t > T,
Pθ(B
q
`t(θ)) > q. (1)
Agent ` learns Q if ` learns each θ ∈ Q.
Individual learning is equivalent to
lim
t→¥Pθ(B
q
`t(θ)) = 1, ∀q ∈ (0,1). (2)
Remark 1 We have formulated individual learning using convergence in proba-
bility rather than almost sure convergence to facilitate the comparison with com-
mon learning. Convergence in probability is in general a weaker notion than al-
most sure convergence. However, since P(θ | H`t) converges almost surely to
some random variable, (2) is equivalent to P(θ | H`t) → 1 Pθ-a.s.

Weassumethateachagentindividuallylearnstheparameter—thereisnopoint
considering common learning if individual learning fails. Our aim is to identify
5the additional conditions that must be imposed to ensure not just that each agent
learns the parameter, but that the agents commonly learn the parameter.
2.2 Common Learning
The event that F ⊂ W is q-believed at time t, denoted by B
q
t (F), occurs if each
agent attaches at least probability q to F, that is,
B
q
t (F) ≡ B
q
1t(F)∩B
q
2t(F).
The event that F is common q-belief at date t is
C
q
t (F) ≡
\
n≥1
[B
q
t ]n(F).
Hence, on C
q
t (F), the event F is q-believed and this event is itself q-believed and
so on. We are interested in common belief as a measure of approximate common-
knowledge because, as shown by Monderer and Samet (1989), it is common belief
that ensures continuity of behavior in incomplete-information games.
A related but distinct notion is that of iterated q-belief. The event that F is
iterated q-belief is deﬁned to be
I
q
t (F) ≡ B
q
1t(F)∩B
q
2t(F)∩B
q
1tB
q
2t(F)∩B
q
2tB
q
1t(F)∩...
Morris (1999, Lemma 14) shows that iterated belief is (possibly strictly) weaker
than common belief:
Lemma 1 (Morris) C
q
t (F) ⊂ I
q
t (F).
See Morris (1999, p. 388) for an example showing the inclusion can be strict.
The parameter θ is common q-belief at time t on the event C
q
t (θ). We say
that the agents commonly learn the parameter θ if, for any probability q, there
is a time such that, with high probability when the parameter is θ, it is common
6q-belief at all subsequent times that the parameter is θ:
Deﬁnition 2 (Common Learning) The agents commonly learn parameter θ ∈Q
if for each q ∈ (0,1) there exists a T such that for all t > T,
Pθ(C
q
t (θ)) > q.
The agents commonly learn Q if they commonly learn each θ ∈ Q.
Common learning is equivalent to
lim
t→¥Pθ(C
q
t (θ)) = 1, ∀q ∈ (0,1).
Because C
q
t (θ) ⊂ B
q
`t(θ), common learning implies individual learning (recall
(2)).
An event F is q-evident at time t if it is q-believed when it is true, that is,
F ⊂ B
q
t (F).
Our primary technical tool links common q-belief and q-evidence. Monderer and
Samet (1989, Deﬁnition 1 and Proposition 3) show:
Proposition 1 (Monderer and Samet) F0 is common q-belief at ω ∈ W and time
t if and only if there exists an event F ⊂ W such that F is q-evident at time t and
ω ∈ F ⊂ B
q
t (F0).
Corollary 1 The agents commonly learn Q if and only if for all θ ∈ Q and q ∈
(0,1), there exists a sequence of events Ft and a period T such that for all t > T,
(i) θ is q-believed on Ft at time t,
(ii) Pθ(Ft) > q, and
(iii) Ft is q-evident at time t.
72.3 Special Cases: Perfect Correlation and Independence
We are primarily interested in private signals that are independently and identi-
cally distributed over time, but not identically or independently across agents. We
begin, however, with two special cases to introduce some basic ideas.
Suppose ﬁrst the signals are public, as commonly assumed in the literature.
Then agent ` knows everything there is to know about ˆ `’s beliefs, and we have
P(θ | H1t) = P(θ | H2t) for all θ and t—and hence beliefs are always common.
Individual learning then immediately implies common learning.
At the other extreme, we have independent signals. Here, the fact that agent `
learns nothing about agent ˆ `’s signals ensures common learning.
Proposition 2 Suppose each agent learns Q and that for each θ ∈Q, the stochas-
tic processes {ζθ
1t}¥
t=0 and {ζθ
2t}¥
t=0 are independent. Then the agents commonly
learn Q.
Proof. Our task is to show that under a given parameter θ and for any q <
1, the event that θ is common q-belief occurs with at least probability q for all
sufﬁciently large t. We let Ft ≡ {θ}∩B
√
q
t (θ) and verify that Ft satisﬁes the
sufﬁcient conditions for common learning provided in Corollary 1
(i) Because Ft ⊂ B
√
q
t (θ) ⊂ B
q
t (θ), parameter θ is q-believed on Ft at time t.
(ii)ToshowPθ(Ft)>q, notethatindependenceimpliesPθ(Ft)=Õ`Pθ(B
√
q
`t (θ)).
By (1), we can choose T sufﬁciently large that Pθ(B
√
q
`t (θ)) >
√
q for all ` and all
t > T and hence Pθ(Ft) > q.
(iii) To show that Ft is q-evident, we must show that Ft ⊂ B
q
`t(Ft) for ` =
1,2. By construction, Ft ⊂ B
√
q
`t (θ). Since B
√
q
`t (θ) ∈ H`t, on Ft agent ` attaches
probability 1 to the state being in B
√
q
`t (θ) and we have
B
q
`t(Ft) ={ω : E[1
B
√
q
`t (θ)1
B
√
q
ˆ `t (θ)∩{θ} | H`t] ≥ q}
={ω : 1
B
√
q
`t (θ)E[1
B
√
q
ˆ `t (θ)∩{θ} | H`t] ≥ q}
=B
√
q
`t (θ)∩B
q
`t(B
√
q
ˆ `t (θ)∩{θ}).
8Thus, it sufﬁces to show that on the set Ft, agent ` attaches at least probability q
to the event B
√
q
ˆ `t (θ)∩{θ}, ˆ ` 6= `. As above, (1) allows us to choose T sufﬁciently
large that Pθ(B
√
q
`t (θ))>
√
q for all ` and allt >T. The conditional independence
of agents’ signals implies that, given θ, agent `’s history is uninformative about
ˆ `’s signals, and hence Pθ(B
√
q
ˆ `t (θ)|H`t)>
√
q.1 But, on Ft, we have P(θ |H`t)>
√
q. Consequently, again on Ft
P(B
√
q
ˆ `t (θ)∩{θ} | H`t) = Pθ(B
√
q
ˆ `t (θ) | H`t)P(θ | H`t) > q, (3)
and we have the desired result.
Remark 2 (Arbitrary ﬁnite number of agents) The proof of Proposition 2 cov-
ers an arbitrary ﬁnite number of agents once we redeﬁne Ft as {θ}∩B
n √
q
t (θ),
where n is the number of agents.

The role of independence in this argument is to ensure that agent `’s signals
provide ` with no information about ˆ `’s signals. Agent ` thus not only learns the
parameter, but eventually thinks it quite likely that ˆ ` has also learned the (same)
parameter (having no evidence to the contrary). In addition, we can place a lower
bound, uniform across agent `’s histories, on how conﬁdent agent ` is that ˆ ` shares
`’s conﬁdence in the parameter (see (3)). This sufﬁces to establish common learn-
ing.
One would expect common learning to be more likely the more information `
has about ˆ `, so that ` has a good idea of ˆ `’s beliefs. When signals are correlated,
`’s signals will indeed often provide useful information about ˆ `’s, accelerating
the rate at which ` learns about ˆ ` and reinforcing common learning. Clearly this
1Since conditional probabilities are only unique for P-almost all states, the set Ft depends upon
the choice of version of the relevant conditional probabilities. In the proof, we have selected the
constant function Pθ(B
√
q
ˆ `t (θ)) as the version of Pθ(B
√
q
ˆ `t (θ) | H`t). For other versions of condi-
tional probabilities, the deﬁnition of Ft must be adjusted to exclude appropriate zero probability
subsets.
9is the case for perfect correlation, but perhaps surprisingly, intermediate degrees
of correlation can generate information that may disrupt common learning. The
danger is that agent 1 may have observed signal frequencies “just” close enough
to lead to some ﬁxed degree of conﬁdence in the value of the parameter, but in the
process may have received evidence that 2’s frequencies are on the “wrong side”
of her corresponding boundary, even though quite close to it. We show this by
example in Section 4.
3 Sufﬁcient Conditions for Common Learning
3.1 Common Learning
For our positive result, we assume that the signal sets are ﬁnite.
Assumption 1 (Finite Signal Sets) Agents 1 and 2 have ﬁnite signal sets, I and
J respectively.
We use I and J to also denote the cardinality of sets I and J, trusting the context
will prevent confusion.
We denote the probability distribution of the agents’ signals conditional on θ
by(πθ(ij))i∈I,j∈J ∈D(I×J). Hence, πθ(ij)istheprobabilitythat(z1t,z2t)=(i, j)
for parameter θ and every t. For each θ ∈ Q, let
Iθ ≡ {i ∈ I :åjπθ(ij) > 0}
and Jθ ≡ {l ∈ J :åiπθ(ij) > 0}
be the sets of signals that appear with positive probability under parameter θ.
Denote
 
πθ(ij)

i∈Iθ,j∈Jθ by Pθ.
We deﬁne φθ(i) ≡ åjπθ(ij) to denote the marginal probability of agent 1’s
signal i and ψθ(j) = åiπθ(ij) to denote the marginal probability of agent 2’s
signal j. We let φθ = (φθ(i))i∈Iθ and ψθ = (ψθ(j))j∈Jθ be the row vectors of
expected frequencies of the agents’ signals under parameter θ. Notice that we
10restrict attention to those signals that appear with positive probability under pa-
rameter θ in deﬁning the vectors φθ and ψθ.
Given Assumption 1, the following is equivalent to (1).
Assumption 2 (Individual Learning) For every pair θ and θ0, the marginal dis-
tributions are distinct, i.e. φθ 6= φθ0
and ψθ 6= ψθ0
.
Our main result is:
Proposition 3 UnderAssumption1andAssumption2, theagentscommonlylearn
Q.
Remark 3 (The role of the common prior and agreement on πθ) Thoughwehave
conserved on notation by presenting Proposition 3 in terms of a common prior, the
analysis applies with little change to a setting where the two agents have different
but commonly known priors. Indeed, the priors need not be commonly known—it
is enough that there be a commonly known bound on the minimum probability
any parameter receives in each agent’s prior. We can modify Lemma 3 to still ﬁnd
a neighborhood of signals frequencies in which every “type” of agent i will assign
high probability to the true parameter. The rest of the proof is unchanged.
Our model also captures settings in which the agents have different beliefs
about the conditional signal-generating distributions (πθ(ij))i∈I,j∈J. In particular,
such differences of opinion can be represented as different beliefs about a param-
eter φθ that determines the signal-generating process given θ. The model can
then be reformulated as one in which agents are uncertain about the joint parame-
ter (θ,φθ) (but know the signal-generating process conditional on this parameter)
and our analysis applied.
Our work is complementary to Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2006),
who consider environments in which even arbitrarily large samples of common
datamaynotreconciledisagreementsinagents’beliefs. Acemoglu, Chernozhukov,
andYildiz(2006)stressthepossibilitythattheagentsintheirmodelmaynotknow
the signal-generating process (πθ(ij))i∈I,j∈J, but we have just argued that this is
11not an essential distinction in our context. The key difference is that the signal-
generating processes considered by Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2006)
need not sufﬁce for individual learning. In our context, it is unsurprising that
common learning need not hold when individual learning fails.

3.2 Outline of the Proof
Let ft(ij) denote the number of periods in which agent 1 has received the signal
i and agent 2 received the signal j before period t. Deﬁning f2t(j) ≡ åi ft(ij)
and f1t(i) ≡ åj ft(ij), the realized frequencies of the signals are given by the row
vectors ˆ φt ≡ (f1t(i)/t)i∈I and ˆ ψt ≡ (f2t(j)/t)j∈J. Finally, let ˆ φθ
t = (f1t(i)/t)i∈Iθ
denote the realized frequencies of the signals that appear with positive probability
under parameter θ, with a similar convention for ˆ ψθ.
The main idea of the proof is to classify histories in terms of the realized
frequencies of signals observed and, for given q ∈ (0,1), to identify events such
as B
q
1t(θ) and B
q
1t(B
q
2t(θ)) with events exhibiting the appropriate frequencies.
Section 3.4 develops the tools required for working with frequencies. The
analysis begins with an open neighborhood of frequencies within which each
agent will assign high probability to parameter θ. Indeed, Lemma 3 shows that
there is a δ >0 so that whenever 1’s observed frequency distribution ˆ φt is within a
distanceδ ofφθ, hismarginalsignaldistributionunderθ, theposteriorprobability
he assigns to θ approaches one over time. Let F1t(0) denote this δ-neighborhood
of φθ,
F1t(0) ≡
n
ω :
   ˆ φθ
t −φθ
   < δ
o
.
By the weak law of large numbers, the probability under θ that the realized fre-
quency falls in F1t(0) converges to one (Lemma 4).
Next, we consider the set of frequencies that characterize the event that 1 as-
signs high probability to θ and to 2 assigning high probability to θ. This involves
three steps.
12STEP 1: Since the event we are interested in implies that 1 assigns high prob-
ability to θ, we can approximate 1’s beliefs about 2 by his beliefs conditional on
θ being the true parameter.
STEP 2: We now introduce an object that plays a central role in the proof, the
Iθ ×Jθ matrix Mθ
1 whose ijth element is
πθ(ij)
φθ(i) , i.e. the conditional probability
under parameter θ of signal j given signal i. At any date t, when agent 1 has
realized frequency distribution ˆ φt, his estimate (expectation) of the frequencies
observed by agent 2 conditional on parameter θ is given by the matrix product
ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 .
The corresponding matrix for agent two, denoted Mθ
2 , is the Jθ ×Iθ matrix with
jith element
πθ(ij)
ψθ(j).
We now make a key observation relating φθ, ψθ, Mθ
1 , and Mθ
2 . Let Dθ
1 be the
Iθ ×Iθ diagonal matrix with ith diagonal element (φθ(i))−1 and let e be a row
vector of 1’s. It is then immediate that
φθMθ
1 = φθDθ
1Pθ = ePθ = ψθ. (4)
A similar argument implies
ψθMθ
2 = φθ. (5)
Note that the product ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 Mθ
2 gives agent 1’s expectation of agent 2’s expec-
tation of the frequencies observed by agent 1 (conditional on θ). Moreover,
Mθ
12 ≡ Mθ
1 Mθ
2 is a Markov transition matrix on the set Iθ of signals for agent
1.2 Section 3.3 collects some useful properties of this Markov process.
From (4), the continuity of the linear map Mθ
1 implies that whenever 1’s fre-
quencies are in a neighborhood of φθ, we are assured that 1 expects that 2’s fre-
quencies are in the neighborhood of ψθ, and hence that 2 assigns high probability
to θ. Of course, “expecting” that 2 assigns high probability to θ is not the same as
2This perspective is inspired by Samet (1998).
13assigning high probability to it, and we must account for the error in 1’s estimate
of 2’s frequencies, leading to the third step.
STEP 3: We need to bound the probability of any large error in this estimate.
Lemma 5 shows that conditional on θ, there is a time T after which the probability
that 2’s realized frequencies are more than some given ε away from 1’s estimate
( ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 ) is less than ε. A crucial detail here is that this bound applies uniformly
across all histories for 1. There is thus a neighborhood of φθ such that if 1’s fre-
quency ˆ φθ
t falls in this neighborhood for sufﬁciently large t, then agent 1 assigns
high probability to the event that 2 assigns high probability to θ. Let F1t(1) denote
this neighborhood, which we can equivalently think of as a neighborhood of ψθ
into which ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 must fall, that is,
F1t(1) ≡
n
ω :
   ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 −ψθ
   < δ −ε
o
,
where ε is small and determined below.
For sufﬁciently large t, the intersection F1t(0)∩F1t(1) ≡ F1t is contained in
B
q
1t(B
q
1t(θ)∩B
q
2t(θ))=B
q
1t(θ)∩B
q
1t(B
q
2t(θ)), providingtheﬁrststepstowardcom-
mon learning. However, in order to show q-common belief, we need to show that
all orders of iterated (joint) q-belief can be obtained on neighborhoods of φθ and
ψθ, and common learning requires in addition these neighborhoods have high
probability. Rather than attempting a direct argument, we apply Corollary 1.
Suppose (for the sake of exposition) that every element of Mθ
12 is strictly pos-
itive. In that case, Mθ
12 is a contraction when viewed as a mapping on DIθ, a
property critical to our argument. Hence, for some r ∈ (0,1), if 1’s frequencies
are within δ of φθ, then 1’s prediction of 2’s prediction of 1’s frequencies are
within rδ of φθ. Consequently, iterating B
q
1t and B
q
2t does not lead to “vanishing”
events.
Fix θ and a period t large. A natural starting point would be to try F1t ∩
F2t (where F2t is deﬁned similarly for agent 2 to F1t) as a candidate for Ft in
Corollary 1. But since we also need Ft to be likely under θ, we intersect these sets
with the event {θ} so that Ft ≡ F1t ∩F2t ∩{θ}.
14Observe that ˆ φθ
t ∈ F1t(0) for all ω ∈ Ft by construction. It is also intuitive
(and indeed true) that θ is q-believed on Ft at time t and that Pθ(Ft) > q for
sufﬁciently large t. It remains to verify that the set Ft is q-evident at time t, that is,
Ft ⊂ B
q
t (Ft) = B
q
1t(Ft)∩B
q
2t(Ft). It sufﬁces to argue that
F1t ∩{θ} ⊂ B
q
1t(F1t ∩F2t ∩{θ})
(the argument is symmetric for agent 2).
We ﬁrst note that F`t ∈H`t (i.e., agent ` knows the event F`t in periodt). Next,
a straightforward application of the triangle inequality yields
F1t(1)∩ ˆ F1t(1) ⊂ F2t(0),
where ˆ F1t(1)≡

ω :
  ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t
  < ε
	
is the event that 2’s realized frequencies
are close to 1’s estimate. Note that the event ˆ F1t(1) may not be known by either
agent (i.e., we may have ˆ F1t(1) 6∈ H`t for ` = 1,2).
SinceMθ
2 isastochasticmatrix, forallω ∈ ˆ F1t(1), wehave
  ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 Mθ
2 − ˆ ψθMθ
2
 
<ε. We now set ε small enough that rδ <δ −2ε. Since Mθ
12 is a contraction with
ﬁxed point φθ (see (4) and (5)), we have, again from the triangle inequality,
F1t(0)∩ ˆ F1t(1) ⊂ F2t(1).
Hence, F1t ∩ ˆ F1t(1) ⊂ F2t, and so
F1t ∩ ˆ F1t(1)∩{θ} ⊂ F2t ∩{θ}.
But, from Lemma 5 (recall step 3) we know that {θ}⊂B
q
1t( ˆ F1t(1)∩{θ}) for large
t. Consequently,
F1t ∩{θ} ⊂ B
q
1t(F1t ∩ ˆ F1t(1)∩{θ}) ⊂ B
q
1t(F1t ∩F2t ∩{θ}),
and we are done.
15The proof of Proposition 3 must account for the possibility that some elements
of Mθ
12 may not be strictly positive. However, as we show in Lemma 2, since Mθ
12
is irreducible when restricted to a recurrence class, some power of this restricted
matrix is a contraction. The proof proceeds as outlined above, with the deﬁnition
of F`t now taking into account the need to take powers of Mθ
12.
Remark 4 (Arbitrary ﬁnite number of agents) Therestrictiontotwoagentssim-
pliﬁes the notation, but the result holds for any ﬁnite number of agents. We illus-
trate the argument for three agents (and keep the notation as similar to the two
agent case as possible). Denote agent 3’s ﬁnite set of signals by K. The joint
probability of the signal proﬁle ijk ∈ I×J×K under θ is πθ(ijk). In addition to
the marginal distributions φθ and ψθ for 1 and 2, the marginal distribution for 3
is ϕθ. As before, Mθ
1 is the Iθ ×Jθ matrix with ijth element åkπθ(ijk)/φθ(i)
(and similarly for M2). For the pair 1−3, we denote by Nθ
1 the Iθ ×Kθ matrix
with ikth element åjπθ(ijk)/φθ(i) (and similarly for Nθ
3 ). Finally, for the pair
2−3, we have analogous deﬁnitions for the matrices Qθ
2 and Qθ
3. As before, φθ is
a stationary distribution of Mθ
1 Mθ
2 , but now also of Nθ
1 Nθ
3 ; similar statements hold
for ψθ and the transitions Mθ
2 Mθ
1 and Qθ
2Qθ
3, as well as for ϕθ and the transitions
Nθ
3 Nθ
1 and Qθ
3Qθ
2.
Suppose (as in the outline and again for exposition only) that every element
of the various Markov transition matrices is non-zero, and let r < 1 now be the
upper bound on the modulus of contraction of the various contractions. The argu-
ment of the outline still applies, once we redeﬁne F1t(1) ≡ {ω :
  ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 −ψθ  <
δ −ε}∩{ω :
  ˆ φθ
t Nθ
1 −ϕθ  < δ −ε} and ˆ F1t(1) ≡ {ω :
  ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ  < ε}∩
{ω :
  ˆ φθ
t Nθ
1 − ˆ ϕθ  < ε} (with similar deﬁnitions for the other two agents).

3.3 Preliminary Results: Expectations about Expectations
We summarize here some important properties of the Markov chains induced by
the transition matrices Mθ
12 and Mθ
21.
16Remark 5 (Markov Chains) From (4) and (5), the vector φθ is a stationary dis-
tribution for Mθ
12 and ψθ is a stationary distribution for Mθ
21 ≡ Mθ
2 Mθ
1 . More-
over, the matrix Mθ
12Dθ
1 = Dθ
1PθDθ
2[Pθ]TDθ
1 is obviously symmetric and has a
nonzero diagonal (where Dθ
2 is the diagonal matrix whose jth diagonal element
is (ψθ(j))−1 for j ∈ Jθ). This ﬁrst property implies that the Markov process Mθ
12
with initial distribution φθ is reversible.3 Consequently, the process has φθ as a
stationary distribution when run backward as well as forward, and hence (since
φθ(i) > 0 for all i ∈ Iθ) has no transient states. The second property implies that
Mθ
12 has a nonzero diagonal and hence is aperiodic.

Remark 6 (Recurrent Classes) Two signals i and i0 belong to the same recur-
rence class under the transition matrix Mθ
12 if and only if the probability of a tran-
sition from i to i0 (in some ﬁnite number of steps) is positive.4 We let (Rθ
1(k))K
k=1
denote the collection of recurrence classes, and we order the elements of Iθ so
that the recurrence classes are grouped together and in the order of their indices.
This is a partition of Iθ because (from Remark 5) there are no transient states.
Similarly, the matrix Mθ
21 ≡ Mθ
2 Mθ
1 is a Markov transition on the set Jθ that we
can partition into recurrence classes (Rθ
2(k))K
k=1.
Deﬁne a mapping ξ from (Rθ
1(k))K
k=1 to (Rθ
2(k))K
k=1 by letting ξ(Rθ
1(k)) =
Rθ
2(k0) if there exist signals i ∈ Rθ
1(k) and j ∈ Rθ
2(k0) with πθ(ij) > 0. Then ξ is a
bijection (as already reﬂected in our notation). It is convenient therefore to group
the elements of Jθ by their recurrence classes in the same order as was done with
Iθ. We use the notation Rθ(k) to refer to the kth recurrence class in either Iθ or
Jθ when the context is clear. This choice of notation also reﬂects the equalities of
3As Mθ
12Dθ
1 is symmetric, the detailed balance equations at φθ hold, i.e.,
φθ(i)Mθ
12(ii0) = φθ(i0)Mθ
12(i0i)
(Br´ emaud, 1999, page 81).
4Since the Markov process has no transient states, if the probability of a (ﬁnite-step) transition
from i to i0 is positive, then the probability of a (ﬁnite-step) transition from i0 to i is also positive.
17the probabilities of Rθ
1(k) and Rθ
2(k) under θ, that is
φθ(Rθ
1(k)) ≡ å
i∈Rθ
1(k)
φθ(i) = å
j∈Rθ
2(k)
ψθ(j) ≡ ψθ(Rθ
2(k)). (6)
Since agent 1 observes a signal in Rθ
1(k) under parameter θ if and only if agent
2 observes a signal in Rθ
2(k), conditional on θ the realized frequencies of the
recurrence classes also agree.

Let γθk denote a probability distribution over Iθ that takes positive values
only on the kth recurrence class Rθ(k), and denote the set of such distributions by
DRθ(k).
Lemma 2 Thereexistr<1andanaturalnumbernsuchthatforallk∈{1,...,K}
and for all γθk, ˜ γθk in DRθ(k)5
  γθk(Mθ
12)n− ˜ γθk(Mθ
12)n
   ≤ r
  γθk− ˜ γθk
   (7)
and similarly for (Mθ
21)n.
Proof. We have noted that Mθ
12 is aperiodic. By deﬁnition, the restriction of
Mθ
12 to any given recurrence class is irreducible and hence ergodic. Thus, because
signals are grouped by their recurrence classes, there exists a natural number n
such that (Mθ
12)n has the block-diagonal form with each block containing only
strictly positive entries. The blocks consist of the non-zero n-step transition prob-
abilitiesbetweensignalswithinarecurrenceclass. Theproductofγθk with(Mθ
12)n
is just the product of γθk restricted to Rθ(k) with the kth block of (Mθ
12)n. Because
it has all non-zero entries, the kth block is a contraction mapping (Stokey and Lu-
cas, 1989, Lemma 11.3). In particular, there exists an r < 1 such that (7) holds.
5For any x ∈ RN, kxk ≡ å
N
k=1|xk| is the variation norm of x.
183.4 Preliminary Results: Frequencies are Enough
Let ˆ φθk denote the distribution over Iθ obtained by conditioning ˆ φ on the kth
recurrence class Rθ(k) (for those cases in which ˆ φθ(Rθ(k)) > 0), and let φθk,
ψθk, and ˆ ψθk
t be analogous.
Our ﬁrst result shows that if agent 1’s signal frequencies are sufﬁciently close
to those expected under θ, the posterior probability he attaches to parameter θ
approaches one.
Lemma 3 There exist δ ∈ (0,1), β ∈ (0,1), and a sequence ξ : N → [0,1] with
ξ(t) → 1 such that
P(θ | h1t) ≥ ξ(t)
for all θ ∈ Q and h1t satisfying P(θ | h1t) > 0,
  ˆ φθk
t −φθk  < δ for all k, and
β <
ˆ φθ
t (Rθ(k))
φθ(Rθ(k)) < β−1 for all k. An analogous result holds for agent 2.
Proof. Fixaparameterθ and ˜ δ <mini,θ{φθ(i):φθ(i)>0}. Then

 ˆ φθk
t −φθk

< ˜ δ for all k only if ˆ φt puts strictly positive probability on every signal i ∈ Iθ. For
θ0 and h1t with P(θ0 | h1t) > 0, deﬁne the ratio
λθθ0
1t ≡ log
P(θ | h1t)
P(θ0 | h1t)
= log
φθ(it−1)P(θ | h1t−1)
φθ0(it−1)P(θ0 | h1t−1)
.
We now show that β and δ ≤ ˜ δ can be chosen so that there exists η > 0 with the
property that
λθθ0
1t ≥ λθθ0
10 +tη ∀θ0 6= θ
for all θ0 ∈ Q and histories h1t for which
  ˆ φθk
t −φθk  < ˜ δ for all k and for which
λθθ0
1t is deﬁned. Notice that λθθ0
10 =
p(θ)
p(θ0) is the log-likelihood ratio at time zero,
that is, the ratio of prior probabilities.
Our choice of ˜ δ, implying that every signal i ∈ Iθ has appeared in the history
h1t, ensures that P(θ0|h1t) > 0 (and hence λθθ0
1t is well deﬁned) only if Iθ ⊂ Iθ0
.
This in turn ensures that the following expressions are well deﬁned (in particular,
having nonzero denominators). Because signals are distributed independently and
19identically across periods, λθθ0
1t can be written as
λθθ0
1t = λθθ0
10 +
t−1
å
s=0
log

φθ(is)
φθ0(is)

.
We ﬁnd a lower bound for the last term. Let
Hθθ0
≡ Eθ

log
φθ(i)
φθ0(i)

> 0
denote the relative entropy of φθ with respect to φθ0
. Then,
    
t−1
å
s=0
log

φθ(is)
φθ0(is)

−tHθθ0
    
=

   å
i∈Iθ
f1t(i)log

φθ(i)
φθ0(i)

−t å
i∈Iθ
φθ(i)log

φθ(i)
φθ0(i)
 
  
=t
    å
i∈Iθ
( ˆ φθ
t (i)−φθ(i))log

φθ(i)
φθ0(i)
    
≤t å
i∈Iθ
   ( ˆ φθ
t (i)−φθ(i))log

φθ(i)
φθ0(i)
   
≤tlogbk ˆ φθ
t −φθk
for b = maxi,θ,θ0∈Q
n
φθ(i)
φθ0(i) : φθ(i) > 0
o
. By Assumption 2, b > 1. Thus,
λθθ0
1t ≥ λθθ0
10 +t

Hθθ0
−logb
   ˆ φθ
t −φθ
  

.
We now argue that δ ≤ ˜ δ and β can be chosen to ensure Hθθ0
−logb
  ˆ φθ
t −φθ >
η for all θ,θ0 and some η > 0. For this, it is enough to observe that the mapping
n
ˆ φθ
t (Rθ(k))
o
k
,
n
ˆ φθk
t
o
k

7→å
k å
i∈k
   ˆ φθ
t (Rθ(k)) ˆ φθk
t (i)−φθ(i)
   =
   ˆ φθ
t −φθ
  
20is continuous and equals zero if and only if ˆ φθ
t (Rθ(k)) = φθ(Rθ(k)) and ˆ φθk
t =
φθk for all k.
We thus have δ and β such that for θ and h1t satisfying the hypotheses of the
lemma and θ0 with P(θ0 | h1t) > 0, it must be that λθθ0
1t ≥ λθθ0
10 +tη and hence
p(θ0)
p(θ)
≥
P(θ0|h1t)
P(θ|h1t)
etη.
Noting that this inequality obviously holds for θ0 with P(θ0 |h1t)=0, we can sum
over θ0 6= θ and rearrange to obtain
P(θ | h1t)
1−P(θ | h1t)
≥
p(θ)
1− p(θ)
etη,
giving the required result.
We next note that with high probability, observed frequencies match their ex-
pected values. Together with Lemma 3, this implies that each agent learns Q.
Lemma 4 For all ε > 0 and θ, Pθ(
  ˆ φθ
t −φθ  < ε) → 1 and Pθ(
  ˆ ψθ
t −ψθ  <
ε) → 1 as t → ¥.
Proof. This follows from the Weak Law of Large Numbers (Billingsley, 1979,
p. 86).
We now show that each agent believes that, conditional on any parameter θ,
his or her expectation of the frequencies of the signals observed by his or her
opponent is likely to be nearly correct. Recall that ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 is agent 1’s expectation
of 2’s frequencies ˆ ψθ
t and that ˆ ψθ
t Mθ
2 is agent 2’s expectation of 1’s frequencies
ˆ φθ
t .
Lemma 5 For any ε1 > 0, ε2 > 0, there exists T such that for all t > T and for
every ht with Pθ(ht) > 0,
Pθ
 
 ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t
 
 < ε1 | h1t

> 1−ε2 (8)
21and
Pθ
   ˆ ψθ
t Mθ
2 − ˆ φθ
t
   < ε1 | h2t

> 1−ε2. (9)
Proof. We focus on (8); the argument for (9) is identical. Deﬁning ¯ ψθ
t ≡
ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 , the left side of (8) is bounded below:
Pθ
 
 ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t

  < ε1

  h1t

≥ 1− å
j∈Jθ
Pθ

  ¯ ψθ
t (j)− ˆ ψθ
t (j)
   ≥
ε1
Jθ
 
 h1t

.
(10)
Conditional on θ and h1t, agent 2’s signals are independently, but not iden-
tically, distributed across time. In period s, given signal is, agent 2’s signals are
distributed according to the conditional distribution (πθ(isj)/φθ(is))j. However,
we can bound the expression on the right side of (10) using a related process ob-
tained by averaging the conditional distributions. The average probability that
agent 2 observes signal j over the t periods {0,1,...,t −1}, conditional on h1t is
1
t
t−1
å
s=0
πθ(isj)
φθ(is)
=å
i
ˆ φt(i)
πθ(ij)
φθ(i)
= ¯ ψθ
t (j),
agent 1’s expectation of the frequency that 2 observed j.
Consider now t independent and identically distributed draws of a random
variable distributed on Jθ according to the “average” distribution ¯ ψθ
t ∈ D(Jθ); we
refer to this process as the average process. Denote the frequencies of signals
generated by the average process by ηt ∈ D(Jθ). The process generating the fre-
quencies ˆ ψt attaches the same average probability to each signal j over periods
0,...,t −1 as does the average process, but does not have identical distributions
(as we noted earlier).
We use the average process to bound the terms in the sum in (10). By Hoeffd-
ing (1956, Theorem 4, p. 718), the original process is more concentrated about its
22mean than is the average process, that is,6
˜ P
   ¯ ψθ
t (j)−ηt(j)
   ≥
ε1
Jθ

≥ Pθ
   ¯ ψθ
t (j)− ˆ ψθ
t (j)
   ≥
ε1
Jθ
   h1t

, j ∈ Jθ,
where ˜ P is the measure associated with the average process. Applying this upper
bound to (10), we have
Pθ

  ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t
   < ε1
   h1t

≥ 1− å
j∈Jθ
˜ P
   ¯ ψθ
t (j)−ηt(j)
   ≥
ε1
Jθ

. (11)
The event {| ¯ ψθ
t (j)−ηt(j)| > ε1/Jθ} is the event that the realized frequency of
a Bernoulli process is far from its mean. By a large deviation inequality ((42) in
Shiryaev (1996, p. 69)),
˜ P

| ¯ ψθ
t (j)−ηt(j)| >
ε1
Jθ

≤ 2e−2tε2
1/(Jθ)2
.
Using this bound in (11), we have
Pθ
   ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t
   < ε1
   h1t

≥ 1−2Jθe−2tε2
1/(Jθ)2
.
This inequality holds for any history h1t. We can thus choose t large enough so
that the right-hand side is less than ε2 and the statement of the lemma follows.
3.5 Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁx an arbitrary parameter θ and deﬁne a sequence of events Ft (suppressing
notation for the dependence of Ft on θ), and show that Ft has the three requisite
properties from Corollary 1 for sufﬁciently large t.
6For example, 100 ﬂips of a (p,1− p) coin generates a more dispersed distribution than 100p
ﬂips of a (1,0) coin and 100(1− p) ﬂips of a (0,1) coin.
23TheeventFt. Letδ ∈(0,1)andβ ∈(0,1)betheconstantsidentiﬁedinLemma3.
Pick ε > 0 such that rδ < δ −2nε where r < 1 and n are identiﬁed in Lemma 2.
For each date t, we deﬁne the event Ft as follows.
First, we ask that agent 1’s realized frequency of signals from Iθ and 2’s from
Jθ be close to the frequencies expected under θ. For each k, deﬁne the events
Fk
1t(0) ≡
n
ω :
   ˆ φθk
t −φθk
   < δ
o
(12)
and Fk
2t(0) ≡
n
ω :
   ˆ ψθk
t −ψθk
   < δ
o
. (13)
Lemma 2 ensures that
  ˆ φθk
t (Mθ
12)n−φθk(Mθ
12)n  will then be smaller than δ on
Fk
1t(0). We deﬁne our event so that the same is true for all powers of Mθ
12 between
0 and n. Hence, for any l ∈ {1,...,n} and for each k, let
Fk
1t(2l−1) ≡
n
ω :
   ˆ φθk
t (Mθ
12)l−1Mθ
1 −ψθk
   < δ −(2l−1)ε
o
(14)
and Fk
1t(2l) ≡
n
ω :
   ˆ φθk
t (Mθ
12)l −φθk
   < δ −2lε
o
. (15)
Similarly, for agent 2,
Fk
2t(2l−1) ≡
n
ω :
   ˆ ψθk
t (Mθ
21)l−1Mθ
2 −φθk
   < δ −(2l−1)ε
o
(16)
and Fk
2t(2l) ≡
n
ω :
   ˆ ψθk
t (Mθ
21)l −ψθk
   < δ −2lε
o
. (17)
Next, deﬁne the events
F1t ≡
K \
k=1
2n−1 \
κ=0
Fk
1t(κ) ≡
K \
k=1
Fk
1t ≡
2n−1 \
κ=0
F1t(κ),
F2t ≡
K \
k=1
2n−1 \
κ=0
Fk
2t(κ) ≡
K \
k=1
Fk
2t ≡
2n−1 \
κ=0
F2t(κ),
[θ] ≡
n
ω ∈ {θ}×(I×J)¥ : Pθ(h`t) > 0, ` ∈ {1,2},t = 0,1,...
o
,
24and
Gθ
t ≡[θ]∩

β <
ˆ φt(Rθ(k))
φθ(Rθ(k))
< β−1, ∀k

≡ [θ]∩G1t (18)
=[θ]∩

β <
ˆ ψt(Rθ(k))
ψθ(Rθ(k))
< β−1, ∀k

≡ [θ]∩G2t. (19)
The equality of the two descriptions of Gθ
t follows from Remark 6. Finally, we
deﬁne the event Ft,
Ft ≡ F1t ∩F2t ∩Gθ
t .
In the analysis that follows, we simplify notation by using {k· k < ε} to denote
the event {ω : k· k < ε}.
θ is q-believed on Ft. By deﬁnition Ft ⊂ F1t(0)∩F2t(0)∩Gθ
t . Lemma 3 then
implies that for any q < 1, we have Ft ⊂ B
q
t (θ) for all t sufﬁciently large.
Ft is likely under θ. If ˆ φt =φθ and ˆ ψt =ψθ, then the inequalities (12)–(19) ap-
pearing in the deﬁnitions of the sets F1t, F2t, and Gθ
t are strictly satisﬁed (because
φθkMθ
1 = ψθk and ψθkMθ
2 = φθk for each k). The (ﬁnite collection of) inequali-
ties (12)–(19) are continuous in ˆ φt and ˆ ψt and independent of t. Hence, (12)–(19)
are satisﬁed for any ˆ φt and ˆ ψt sufﬁciently close to φθ and φθ. We can therefore
choose ε† > 0 sufﬁciently small such that
{k ˆ φt −φθk < ε†, k ˆ ψt −ψθk < ε†}∩[θ] ⊂ Ft, ∀t.
By Lemma 4, the Pθ-probability of the set on the left side approaches one as t
gets large, ensuring that for all q ∈ (0,1), Pθ(Ft) > q for all large enough t.
Ft is q-evident. We show that for any q, Ft is q-evident when t is sufﬁciently
large. Recallingthatε andβ wereﬁxedindeﬁningFt, chooseε1 ≡εβ minj∈Jθ ψθ(j).
Note that ε1/ ˆ ψθ(Rθ(k)) < ε on the events F1t ∩Gθ
t and F2t ∩Gθ
t .
25[STEP 1] The ﬁrst step is to show that if the realized frequencies of agent 1’s
signals are close to their population frequencies under θ and his expectations of
agent 2’s frequencies are not too far away from agent 2’s realized frequencies,
then (conditional on θ) the realized frequencies of agent 2’s signals are also close
to their population frequencies under θ. In particular, we show
F1t ∩Gθ
t ∩
n   ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t
   < ε1
o
⊂ F2t. (20)
First, ﬁx k and note that for each l = 1,...,n,
Fk
1t(2l)∩{
   ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθk
t
   < ε}
⊂ Fk
1t(2l)∩{
   ˆ φθk
t (Mθ
12)l − ˆ ψθk
t (Mθ
21)l−1Mθ
2
   < ε}
= {
 
 ˆ φθk
t (Mθ
12)l −φθk
 
 < δ −2lε}∩{
 
 ˆ φθk
t (Mθ
12)l − ˆ ψθk
t (Mθ
21)l−1Mθ
2
   < ε}
⊂ {
   ˆ ψθk
t (Mθ
21)l−1Mθ
2 −φθk
   < δ −(2l−1)ε}
= Fk
2t(2l−1). (21)
The ﬁrst inclusion uses the fact that (Mθ
21)l−1Mθ
2 is a stochastic matrix. The equal-
ities use the deﬁnitions of Fk
1t(2l) and Fk
2t(2l −1). The last inclusion is a conse-
quence of the triangle inequality. Similarly, for l = 1,...,n, we have
Fk
1t(2l−1)∩{
 
 ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθk
t

  < ε} ⊂ Fk
2t(2(l−1)).
This sufﬁces to conclude that
2n−1 \
κ=1
Fk
1t(κ)∩{

  ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθk
t
   < ε} ⊂
2n−2 \
κ=0
Fk
2t(κ). (22)
26We next note that
Fk
1t(0)∩{
   ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθk
t
   < ε} ⊂ Fk
1t(2n)∩{
   ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθk
t
   < ε}
⊂ Fk
2t(2n−1), (23)
where Fk
1t(0) ⊂ Fk
1t(2n) is an implication of φθk(Mθ
12)n = φθk, Lemma 2, and
our choice of ε and n; while the second inclusion follows from (21) (for l = n).
Combining (22)–(23) for k = 1,...,K, we have
F1t ∩
\
k
n   ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθk
t
   < ε
o
⊂ F2t. (24)
As the matrix Mθ
1 maps recurrence classes to recurrence classes, on Gθ
t we
have that
k ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t k = å
k
k ˆ φθ
t (Rθ(k)) ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t (Rθ(k)) ˆ ψθk
t k
> k ˆ φθ
t (Rθ(k)) ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t (Rθ(k)) ˆ ψθk
t k
= ˆ ψθ
t (Rθ(k))k ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθk
t k,
since ˆ φθ
t (Rθ(k)) = ˆ ψθ
t (Rθ(k)) on [θ] (recall Remark 6). Our choice of ε1 then
yields that, on F1t ∩Gθ
t ,
   ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t
   < ε1 ⇒ ε >
ε1
ˆ ψθ
t (Rθ(k))
> k ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθk
t k, ∀k.
Therefore
F1t ∩Gθ
t ∩
n   ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t
   < ε1
o
⊂ F1t ∩
\
k
n   ˆ φθk
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθk
t
   < ε
o
,
and by (24) we have proved (20).
[STEP 2] We now conclude the proof of q-evidence. Pick p ∈
 √
q,1

and set
ε2 = 1− p in Lemma 5.
27Consider the event F1t ∩Gθ
t . For t sufﬁciently large, given any history consis-
tent with a state in F1t∩Gθ
t , agent 1 attaches at least probability p to θ (F1t∩Gθ
t ⊂
B
p
1t(θ)) (Lemma 3). Conditional on θ we have, by Lemma 5, that for larget, agent
1 attaches probability at least p to
  ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t
  < ε1. Hence
F1t ∩Gθ
t ⊂ B
p2
1t
n   ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t
   < ε1
o
∩[θ]

.
Since F1t ∩G1t is measurable with respect to H1t and Gθ
t = [θ]∩G1t, we have
F1t ∩Gθ
t ⊂ B
p2
1t

F1t ∩Gθ
t ∩
n   ˆ φθ
t Mθ
1 − ˆ ψθ
t
   < ε1
o
,
and hence, from (20),
F1t ∩Gθ
t ⊂ B
p2
1t

F1t ∩F2t ∩Gθ
t

= B
p2
1t (Ft). (25)
A similar argument for agent 2 gives F2t ∩Gθ
t ⊂ B
p2
2t (Ft) and thus Ft ⊂ B
p2
t (Ft) ⊂
B
q
t (Ft) for sufﬁciently large t.
4 A Counterexample to Common Learning
This section presents an example in which Assumption 1 fails and common learn-
ing does not occur, although the agents do privately learn. There are two values
of the parameter, θ0 and θ00, satisfying 0 < θ0 < θ00 < 1. Signals are nonnegative
integers. The distribution of signals is displayed in Figure 2.7 If we set θ0 = 0
and θ00 = 1 , then we can view one period of this process as an instance of the
signals in Rubinstein’s (1989) electronic mail game, where the signal corresponds
to the number of “messages” received.8 It is immediate that the agents faced with
7It would cost only additional notation to replace the single value ε in Figure 2 with heteroge-
neous values, as long as the resulting analogue of (26) is a collection whose values are bounded
away form 0 and 1.
8Rubinstein (1989) is concerned with whether a single signal drawn from this distribution
allows agents to condition their action on the state, while we are concerned with whether an arbi-
28Probability Player-1 signal Player-2 signal
θ 0 0
ε(1−θ) 1 0
(1−ε)ε(1−θ) 1 1
(1−ε)2ε(1−θ) 2 1
(1−ε)3ε(1−θ) 2 2
(1−ε)4ε(1−θ) 3 2
(1−ε)5ε(1−θ) 3 3
. . .
. . .
. . .
Figure 2: The distribution of signals for the counterexample given parameter θ ∈
{θ0,θ00}, where ε ∈ (0,1).
a sequence of independent draws from this distribution learn Q. We now show
that common learning does not occur.
What goes wrong when trying to establish common learning in this context,
and how does this depend upon the inﬁnite set of signals? Establishing common
q-belief in parameter θ requires showing that if agent 1 has observed signals just
on the boundary of inducing probability q that the parameter is θ, then agent 1
nonetheless believes 2 has seen signals inducing a similar belief (and believes that
2 believes 1 has seen such signals, and so on). In the case of ﬁnite signals, a
key step in this argument is the demonstration that (an appropriate power of) the
Markov transition matrix Mθ
12 is a contraction. In the current case, the correspond-
ing Markov process is not a contraction (though the marginal distribution is still
stationary). As a result, agent ` can observe signals on the boundary of inducing
probability q of state θ while believing that agent ˆ ` has observed signals on the
“wrong side” of this boundary.
The ﬁrst step in our argument is to show that, regardless of what agents have
trarily large number of signals sufﬁces to commonly learn the parameter. Interestingly, repeated
observation of the original Rubinstein process (i.e., θ0 = 0 and θ00 = 1) leads to common learning.
In particular, consider the event Ft at date t that the state is θ0 and no messages have ever been re-
ceived. This event is q(t)-evident where q(t) approaches 1 as t approaches inﬁnity, since 1 assigns
probability 1 and 2 assigns a probability approaching 1 to Ft whenever it is true.
29observed, nth-order beliefs attach positive probability to agent 2 having observed
larger and larger (and rarer and rarer) signals, as n gets larger (cf. (27) and (29)
below). We then argue that agents attaching strictly positive nth-order belief to
agent 2 having observed such extraordinarily rare signals will also attach strictly
positive nth order-belief to another rare event—that agent 2 has never seen a zero
signal (cf. (31)). Since zero signals are more likely under parameter θ00, this
ensures a positive nth-order belief in agent 2’s being being conﬁdent the parameter
is θ0, even when it is not, precluding common learning.
Let
q ≡ min

ε(1−θ00)
θ00+ε(1−θ00)
,
(1−ε)
(2−ε)

. (26)
Note that regardless of the signal observed by agent 1, he always believes with
probability at least q that 2 has seen the same signal, and regardless of the signal
observed by 2, she always believes with probability at least q that 1 has seen a
higher signal.
We show that for allt sufﬁciently large there is (independently of the observed
history) a ﬁnite iterated q-belief that θ0 is the true parameter. This implies that θ00
can never be iterated p-believed for any p > 1−q, with Lemma 1 then implying
that θ00 can never be common p-belief. That is, we will show that for t large
enough, B
q
2t(θ0) = W and so B
p
2t(θ00) = ∅ for all p > 1−q.
Deﬁne for each k, the event that agent ` observes a signal of at least k before
time t:
D`t(k) ≡ {ω : z`s ≥ k for some s ≤t}.
Note that D`t(0) is equal to W (the event that any t-length history occurs). For
every k ≥ 0 the deﬁnition of q implies:
D1t(k) ⊂ B
q
1t(D2t(k)),
and
D2t(k−1) ⊂ B
q
2t(D1t(k)),
30which together imply
D2t(k−1) ⊂ B
q
2tB
q
1t(D2t(k)).
By induction, for all 0 ≤ m ≤ k,
D2t(m) ⊂
 
B
q
2tB
q
1t
k−m(D2t(k)). (27)
Now, for any K and any list
 
k1,k2,...,kK
, where ks ≥ ks−1, deﬁne the event
that agent ` observes distinct signals of at least ks before time t,
D`t
 
k1,k2,...,kK
≡ {ω : ∃ distinct τs ≤t, s = 1,...,K, s.t. z`τs ≥ ks}.
Note that for K ≤ t, D`t(0,k2,...,kK) = D`t(k2,...,kK). Whenever agent 1 ob-
serves a signal k he knows that agent 2 has seen a signal at least k−1. Hence,
D1t
 
k1,k2,...,kK
⊂ B
q
1t(D2t(k1,k2−1,k3−1,...,kK −1))
and by similar reasoning
D2t
 
k1,k2,...,kK
⊂ B
q
2t(D1t(k1+1,k2,k3,...,kK)),
so that for all n, if 0 ≤ k1 ≤ k2−2n, then
D2t
 
k1,k2,...,kK
⊂
 
B
q
2tB
q
1t
nD2t(k1+n,k2−n,k3−n,...,kK −n). (28)
From (27),
W = D2t(0) ⊂
 
B
q
2tB
q
1t
2t−1
D2t(2t−1) (29)
and, for t ≥ 2, from (28),
D2t(2t−1) = D2t(0,2t−1) ⊂
 
B
q
2tB
q
1t
2t−2
D2t(2t−2,2t−2). (30)
31Inserting (30) in (29) gives W ⊂
 
B
q
2tB
q
1t
2t−1+2t−2
D2t(2t−2,2t−2). Continuing in
this fashion and noting that 2t−1+2t−2+...+2t−t = 2t −1, we obtain
W ⊂
 
B
q
2tB
q
1t
2t−1D2t(2t−t,2t−t,...,2t−t
| {z }
t times
) =
 
B
q
2tB
q
1t
2t−1D2t(1,1,...,1 | {z }
t times
). (31)
Now choose t large enough so that after a t-length history in which signal 0
was never observed, agent 2 assigns probability at least q to θ0, i.e.,9
D2t(1,1,...,1 | {z }
t times
) ⊂ B
q
2t(θ0).
Using (31), we then have W ⊂
 
B
q
2tB
q
1t
2t−1B
q
2t(θ0) and hence have shown that for
t large enough, regardless of the history, there cannot be iterated p-belief in θ00 for
any p > 1−q, i.e. Ip(θ00) = ∅. Now by Lemma 1, Cp(θ00) = ∅.
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